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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, section 782a-3(2)(j) (2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Plaintiffs' statement of issue No. 1 is a misstatement of the issue. The claim of the

Plaintiffs is for a prescriptive easement.

The facts in the Plaintiffs' own disclosures and

statements demonstrate that the Court's ruling was correct. Plaintiffs' assertion in issue number
1 that a land owner who uses an access roadway as a matter of right for more than 20 years may
be a correct statement of the law under different circumstances, but not in the case at bar.
Plaintiffs would have to demonstrate that the 20 year period from 1973 when they acquired their
property was uninterrupted for 20 years. The interruption prevents that 20 year period from being
established, either running from 1973 or after 1987, when a documented interruption of use came
about. The other problem with the first issue is that it has to be as a matter of right. Plaintiffs
demonstrated no matter of right for the use of the roadway and in fact it contradicts the very
lawsuit brought herein, claiming an adverse prescriptive easement not under claim of right.
2.

Plaintiffs assert that a closure of the road for maintenance does not constitute an

interruption to defeat a prescriptive easement. Failing to address the issue that the prescriptive
easement has to be adverse and known to the owner of the property being crossed that it was
adverse, Plaintiffs presented no testimony whatsoever on any event that created the adversity
between Peays, as the owners of the property, and the Halls; thus, the decision of Ihe Court was
correct on that issue. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs acknowledge that the property has been closed
off every 3 or 4 years by the Peays.

3.

The Plaintiffs failed during the course of the litigation to address the ownership

issue now claimed to be newly discovered evidence and in fact they submitted the supposed newly
discovered evidence, a 1992 deed from Roger Gillespie to the Peays, as part of their Rule 26(a)
Disclosures and in their motion for new trial asserted that they did have knowledge of the deed
but did not know of the significance of it. The deeds and the areas encompassed are matters of
public record available prior to the initial hearing on the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
and cannot constitute newly discovered evidence that would have caused the Court to even pause
on the issue of newly discovered evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The Defendants own certain real property located in Utah County, Utah. (Record at 206210, 230 paragraph 1, 289 paragraphl.)

The Plaintiffs own real property to the north of

Defendants' property. (Record at 230 paragraph 2-3; 289 paragraphs 2-3.) The Plaintiffs have
a legal access to their property which enters the Plaintiffs' property from the north via 5500
North. (Record at 61 paragraph 7-9; 180 paragraphs 2-5; 230 paragraph 5; 287 paragraph 5.)
The Plaintiffs have also been permitted by the Defendants to access their property from the south
over the Defendants' property via Canyon Road. (Record at 61 paragraph 7-9; 200 paragraph 3;
230 paragraph 4; 288 paragraph 4.) In August 2002, the Defendants installed a gate on their
property which prevents further use of the access across the Defendants' property by the
Plaintiffs. This case was brought by the Plaintiffs to acquire an easement across the Defendants'
property.
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Course of Proceedings
Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this matter on December 2, 2002. (Record at 16.) With
the Complaint, they brought a motion for temporary restraining order. (Record at 17.) The trial
court denied the temporary restraining order on January 10, 2003. (Record at 33.) Plaintiffs then
filed their Amended Complaint on April 25, 2003. (Record at 62.)
The Plaintiffs' Amended Verified Complaint contains six Causes of Action, including a
Quiet Title claim to the easement, an Easement by Grant claim, an Easement by Implication
through Grant or Reservation claim, an Easement by Necessity claim, a Trespass claim, and
lastly, a request for a permanent injunction. (Record at 54-62). The Defendants filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff, Gashler, as the Gashler property was foreclosed and
Gashler never appeared further in the case.
In December 2003 the remaining parties, Defendants Peays, and Plaintiffs Halls, each filed
Motions for Summary Judgment. (Record at 136 and 181.) The Defendants' initial Memorandum
and Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment argue for the dismissal of
all six causes of action contained in the Verified Amended Complaint. (Record at 212-231; 306307.) The Plaintiffs, however, did not address four of their six causes of action in any of their
memoranda for or against summary judgment, and merely argued for summary judgment based
on Easement by Prescription and Easement by Necessity. (Record at 173; 178.) At the hearing
on the Motions for Summary Judgment, the trial court began by asking the parties the following:
The Judge:

Mr. Jeffs:

And I'm just wondering if we have a case that is fact
sensitive that prohibits it from being resolved by
summary judgment. . . . Your observations, do you
believe that, that where we are we need additional
facts to resolve the case?
I don't think so.
3

Mr. Lowry:
The Judge:

I don't, Your Honor. I think we've briefed that also
and I'd be happy to address that specific question.
All right. Well then I'll hear you each on your
summary judgment arguments . . . .

(Record Transcript page 3, lines 20-22, 24-25; page 4, lines 1-6.) Later in argument, Plaintiffs'
counsel again stated that the facts were not disputed and that summary judgment could be entered.
Mr. Lowry:

I'm not going to waste my time on a summary
judgment motion if I've got a big glumping fact
issue sitting out here that kind of spoils the pudding.
I didn't see that here. I brought this motion because
I felt that was not the case.

(Record Transcript, page 16, lines 7-11.) The parties agreed that all of the facts were before the
court and that summary judgment could be properly granted.
Disposition
After the hearing on the matter, the trial court issued a ruling granting the Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' Complaint, and denying the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at 347-352.) Judge Stott specifically noted:
The Court queried counsel prior to receiving their oral argument on
their respective positions as to whether the Court needed additional
facts to decide the issues raised in each party's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Both counsel emphatically represented to the
Court that the Court had sufficient facts to decide the Motions.
After a complete review of the information provided and the
applicable cases, the Court agrees with counsel that there are
sufficient facts to support the Court's ruling.
(Record at 350.) Judge Stott's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment was entered
on June 17, 2004. (Record at 355-360.) On June 30, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a New
Trial (Record at 362), which was denied by the trial court on September 27, 2004. (Record at
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434.) The Order Denying Motion for New Trial was entered on October 4, 2004. (Record at
437-438.) On October 29, 2004 Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal. (Record at 445.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs cite to the findings by the Court for their statement of facts, thus acknowledging
the findings by the Court to be undisputed. Rule 24(e) requires that citations to the record should
be to the page of the record. The selection by the Plaintiffs citing to the findings of the Court as
being the factual bases for their claims is contrary to the Rule 24(e) of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure and is essentially an acknowledgment that the findings of the Court are accurate. The
contention of the Plaintiffs that the Peays did not own a part of the property at the time of the
purported permission ignores the documents presented to the trial court in the formi of the survey
record (Record at 391) which shows that the access way across the Peay property was more than
one-half titled in the Peays from 1969 and thus their permission to utilize it was given
appropriately. The fact that the Peays did not receive a deed to a part of the ground on which the
access way exists until 1992, does not establish that they did not have an ownership interest in the
property and the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate or produce evidence rebutting the rights of the
Peays to the property.
1.

The Defendants, Robert Peay and Janice Peay [the "Peays"], purchased a piece of

property in 1969. (Record at 206-210; 230 paragraph 1; 289 paragraphl.)
2.

At the time the Peays purchased their property, the adjacent piece of property to

the north of the Peays' property was owned by Mr. and Mrs. J. Norman Smith [the "Smiths"].
(Record at 230 paragraphs 2-3; 289 paragraphs 2-3.)
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3.

On April 25, 1973, Plaintiffs, Dean Hall and Donna Hall [the "Halls"], purchased

a portion of the Smiths' property to build a residence located at 5490 North canyon Road, Provo,
Utah by way of a warranty deed from the Smiths. (Record at 169; 180 paragraph 1; 230
paragraph 3; 289 paragraph 3.
4.

Donna and Dean Hall are the daughter and son-in-law of the Smiths and the Smiths'

successors in interest to their home site. (Record at 169; 230 paragraph 3; 289 paragraphs 3.)
5.

On July 31, 2002, Plaintiff, David Gashler, purchased the Smiths' residence located

at 5440 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah. (Record at 62 paragraph 5.)
6.

Plaintiffs' property has two methods of access. (Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint,

Record at 61 paragraph 7.) The access from the north (off of 5500 North Street) is the actual
legal access which Utah County required that the Plaintiffs acquire by easement over Provo City
property, as a condition of the county issuing a permit for the construction of the Halls' home.
(Record at 252-253; 272-273; 300-301.) The Plaintiffs' property can be accessed from the south
by crossing over the Peays' property (Record at 61 paragraph 8) and can be accessed from the
north. (Record at 61 paragraph 9.)
7.

After acquiring the property, the Halls applied for a building permit to build a

home. Because it did not have frontage on a public street, they had to go before the Board of
Adjustment and the Utah County Board of Adjustment required as a condition of issuing the
building permit for the construction of their home, an easement across property owned by Provo
City and frontage on the public road.

(Record 252 & 253, Addendum "A", attached and

highlighted.) The county did not require any easement or access way across the Peay property.
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8.

The Peays, since purchasing the property in 1969, have closed off access across

their property several times for resurfacing and asphalting and to block access. (Affidavit of
Robert Peay. (Record at 204, paragraph 1.) This was acknowledged by the Plaintiffs in their
own affidavits and the representation of their counsel at the argument of the cross Motions for
Summary Judgement. Plaintiffs presented no evidence that they ever disputed the closing of the
access way by the Defendants. (Record Transcript page 6 lines 4-9; Record at 179 paragraph 8;
190; 199-201; 203-204; 229 paragraphs 8-11; Plaintiffs' Memorandum, 286 paragraphs 8-11.)
In 1987, the resurfacing and asphalting closed the road, and all access to the Plaintiffs' property
from the south, for three days. (Record at 190.) Plaintiffs admitted the three-day closure in
1987. (Record at 286 paragraph 10.) Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment cited such closure. (Record at 229 paragraph 10.) The trial Court received
photographs demonstrating the closure of the road. (Record at 188.)
9.

Plaintiffs, in their affidavits and memoranda and in their oral argument on the

hearing of the cross Motions for Summary Judgment have acknowledged the closures in their
memorandum opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Motion for Summary
Judgment (Record at 178, paragraph 9; Record at 284, last paragraph; Transcript page 6:4-9.)
The Defendants provided evidence that they closed off access to their property several times, not
only for resurfacing and asphalting, but also because the Defendants knew that any prescriptive
easements could be prevented from arising by closing off access. (Record at 203-204; 200
paragraph 6.)
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10.

Plaintiffs Halls and their predecessors in interest have been allowed to utilize the

access across the Peays' property from 1973 until August, 2002, when a gate was installed by the
Peays. (Record at 179 paragraph 5.)
11.

Prior to the installation of the gate in August, 2002, no one was prevented from

using the road, except for the times when the road was re-asphalted or when slurry was applied
every three to four years. (Record at 178-179 paragraph 9.)
12.

In 1969, the Peays gave Norman Smith and his family permission to cross the front

part of the Defendants' property so that Norman Smith and his family could have a more
convenient access to their property than their legal access. The Peays initially allowed Mr. Smith
this access because of his need to park a school bus on his property. (Record at 200 paragraph 3;
230 paragraph 4; 288 paragraph 4.)
13.

After purchasing a portion of the Norman Smith property in 1973, the Plaintiffs

never established an event or point in time where the permissive use became adverse. (Record
at 266; 297; Greeny. Stansfield. 886 P.2d 117 (Utah 1994); Savage v. Nielson, 197 P.2d 117,
124 (Utah 1948); Luntv. Kitchens. 260 P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 1953).
14.

This permissive family use was ended when Mr. Gashler purchased the property

in August, 2002 and Mr. Peay put up a gate to prevent access. (Record at 179 paragraph 9.)
15.

There were several interruptions of use of the road by the Defendants. Both parties

acknowledge that on numerous occasions the Defendants would shut off access as represented by
the photographs showing the ropes and barricades, see Exhibit "B" to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Record at 188.) During those times, the Defendants would re-asphalt and
apply slurry to the road in an effort to maintain it and make it available for use. When the Peays
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shut off access to the road during repairs, there were never any objections voiced by the Smiths
or the Halls.
16.

There exists no issue of unity of title. (Record at 203 paragraph 5.)

17.

The entire roadway in question is on the property owned by the Peays. (Record at

179 paragraph 4.)
18.

Plaintiffs had knowledge of the 1992 deed from Roger and Janie Gillespie to the

Peays at the time of filing their Initial Disclosures and attached a copy to it. (Record at 395-413,
specifically Record at 405.)
19.

Plaintiffs, with due diligence, could have discovered the property covered by the

Gillespie deed through survey or other means. (Record at 438). In fact, the Plaintiffs did survey
the area and attached a copy to their Motion for New Trial. (Record at 368.)
20.

If found to be material, Plaintiffs could have presented such information to the

Court at the time of the hearing of this matter on the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment.
(Record at 438.)
21.

Plaintiffs have failed to establish newly discovered evidence which could not, with

reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at the hearing on the Motions for
Summary Judgment. (Record at 437.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Plaintiffs raise three issues on their appeal. In the first issue raised by Plaintiffs, they
claim that the court erred by holding that the Plaintiffs' use of the access was permissive. The
Plaintiffs claim that this holding is contrary to law because the Defendants only gave permission
to "Norman Smith and his family", and did not personally give permission to the Halls. The
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Plaintiffs' argument fails for two reasons. First, the Halls are part of the Norman Smith family
and were given permission to use the access, just like the other members of the Norman Smith
family. Second, permission need not be given personally, and there is no law cited by the
Plaintiffs to suggest otherwise. Third, contrary to the Plaintiffs' assertions, permission to use the
Defendants' property for access need not be given "by express agreement."
The second issue raised by the Plaintiffs is that the trial court erred by holding that the
admitted periodic, several-day-long closures of the road by the Defendants effectively interrupted
the twenty years of uninterrupted and continuous adverse use needed to establish a prescriptive
easement. This argument must fail because it is in direct opposition to prescriptive easement law.
The Utah Supreme Court has explained "under the well established rule, the use, in order that it
may ripen into a prescriptive title, must, in any case, not only be adverse and continuous, and
under claim of right for a period 20 years, but it must be uninterrupted throughout that period."
Morris v. Blunt, 161 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916); see also Jensen v. Gerrard. 39 P.2d 1070
(Utah 1935). Even if the Plaintiffs' use of the road was not permissive, it was, by their own
admission, interrupted regularly. (Record Transcript page 6 lines 4-9; Record at 179 paragraph
8; 188; 190; 199-201; 203-204; 229 paragraphs 8-11; 286 paragraphs 8-11.)
The third issue raised on appeal is that the court abused its discretion by not granting a
new trial based on evidence, not newly discovered, but rather, newly understood. (Record at 364
paragraph 3.) The fact is that the Plaintiffs were fully aware of the evidence they claim is new
from the inception of this case. In fact, the Plaintiffs themselves included the new evidence in
their Initial Rule 26(a) Disclosures to the Defendants. (Record at 395-413, specifically 405.) Even
if the Plaintiffs did not have the evidence in their possession since the inception of this case or
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were not aware of the legal significance of the evidence, if any, the fact remains that the Plaintiffs
could have found the evidence with due diligence or could have understood the legal significance
of it, if any. This fact precludes the granting of a new trial. Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying a new trial.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs cite to Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 92 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998), as a two-step process.
The first being a party claiming a prescriptive easement must prove that its use of another's land
results in a continuous and adverse use under a claim of right for a period of 20 years. Plaintiffs
presented no evidence of a claim of right to that access for the 20 year period, nor did they
present evidence that showed it was continuous and uninterrupted. Because they have failed to
show continuous use without interruption it can not be presumed to have been adverse and thus
their claim fails. Plaintiffs further cite that the second issue is that the owner must show the
servient estate has the burden to establish the use was initially permissive. The Court's finding
on that fact was the testimony of Robert Peay both on deposition and on affidavit (Record at 236,
paragraph 1; Record at 241, paragraph 3; Record at 238, paragraph 4) and the trial court was
never presented with any rebutting testimony or evidence. Plaintiffs assert that the Court focused
on the second prong of the Valcarce formula but they ignore the fact that the Court specifically
made findings and evidence that the use had not been continuous and had been interrupted every
3 to 4 years by the Plaintiffs' own admissions. The Court did not just focus on the second prong
but examined the interruption issue, the adverse issue, and the issue of permission. The Court
found that it was undisputed that the initial use of the road was permissive. Plaintiffs focus on
the testimony that Mr. Peay had never had an agreement with the Halls regarding the road, but
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they failed to demonstrate any event that established an adverse use and put Peays on notice of
a claim of adverse use.
The facts of this case have never been disputed by the Plaintiffs.

At the hearing on

summary judgment, counsel agreed that the facts are not at issue and that summary judgment
could be entered on motion by the trial court. (Record, Transcript, page 3, lines 20-22, 24-25,
page 4, lines 1-6.) After the summary judgment hearing was held, the trial court agreed that the
facts were not at issue and that summary judgment could be granted. (Record at 350.) On
appeal, the Plaintiffs do not dispute the facts, including the specific facts relevant to the issues
presented by the Plaintiffs on appeal. For example, the Plaintiffs do not dispute that permission
was given to Norman Smith and his family to use the road. (Appellants' Brief, page 4.) Further,
the Plaintiffs do not dispute that the road was periodically closed off for days at a time during the
twenty year period needed to establish a prescriptive easement. (Appellants' Brief, page 3.)
Finally, the Plaintiffs do not dispute that they were in possession of the purported "new evidence"
since the inception of this case. (Appellants' Brief, page 14.) The trial court applied these and
the other material undisputed facts to the long-standing Utah easement law and correctly granted
summary judgment in the Defendants' favor.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT AN ERROR IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
A*

Permission to Use a Road Need Not Be Given Formally or by Agreement in
Order to Prevent a Prescriptive Easement from Arising.

The Plaintiffs' main argument relating to the first Issue on appeal is not new. The same
argument was also made to the trial court, which correctly rejected it. Plaintiffs argue that in
order to give permission to a family to use an access, one must approach each and every member
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of that family and directly give that person express formal permission. The Plainliffs provide no
law to support this argument. The Plaintiffs make a related point that the Defendants never had
"an agreement with the Halls regarding the road." (Appellants' Brief pg. 7.) Again, however,
the Plaintiffs provide no law to support the argument that the permission to use a road must be
by express agreement. In fact, the giving of permission, by its very nature, need not be a two
party agreement, rather, it is a voluntary accommodation by one party to another.
Nowhere in any cited law is there a requirement that permission must be formally or
expressly given to specific members of a group. The fact is that the Defendants gave permission
not just to Norman Smith, but Norman Smith and his family to use the Defendant's property, not
merely to drive and park a school bus, but to access their own properties. This is undisputed.
This permission may be properly characterized as neighborly accommodation. Neighborly
accommodation makes the Plaintiffs' use of the Defendants' road permissive. The Utah Supreme
Court explained:
An antagonistic or adverse use of a way cannot spring from a
permissive use. A prescriptive title must be acquired adversely.lt
cannot be adverse when it rests upon a license or mere neighborly
accommodation.
Savage v.Nielson , 197 P.2d 117, 123 (Utah 1948 (emphasis added)).

"Neighborly

accommodations" do not require formal talks. They do not require that two or more parties enter
into an agreement. Neighborly accommodations are routinely based merely on neighbor A's
unspoken allowance of neighbor B's use of A's land.
The nature of permission in the context of an easement is clear from the court's holding
in Savage v. Nielson, in which the court explained that
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If the use is accompanied by any recognition in express terms or by
implication of the right of the landowner to stop such use now or at
some time in the future, the use is not adverse.
Savage at 35 (Emphasis added). The facts of the case at bar show that the Defendants not only
implied a right to stop the Plaintiffs' use, but in fact, did stop the Plaintiffs' use on numerous
occasions throughout the purported twenty year period needed for a prescriptive easement to arise.
(Record Transcript page 6 lines 4-9; Record at 179 paragraph 8; 188; 190; 199-201; 203-204; 229
paragraphs 8-11; 286 paragraphs 8-11.) Consequently, the Plaintiffs' use of the road cannot be
adverse. The rationale of the holding in Savage is confirmed by the holding in Thompson v.
Schuh, 593 P.2d 1138 (Or. 1979). In Thompson, the court explained that because such denials
of use would be legally actionable if an established easement did in fact exist, such denials of use
are sufficient to interrupt any claim of open, notorious, adverse, and continuous use of the
Defendants' property for a period of 20 years. The Plaintiffs never complained or raised any
objections to these periodic, several-day-long denials of access. (Record at 283-284.) Further,
the Defendants never asked permission of the Plaintiffs to shut off access. (Record at 283.) The
denials of use, and the fact that both parties recognized the Defendants' authority to deny use
provide undisputed factual bases for the Court's summary judgment ruling.
The Plaintiffs also cite to Green v. Stansfield. 886 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah App. 1994) for
the proposition that "the fact that a use was originally permissive does not preclude a later finding
of adverse use." The Plaintiffs, however, fail to cite the further requirement in

Green v.

Stansfield, which is that "it is incumbent on the licensee to offer proof establishing the point at
which use became adverse." Id.

The Plaintiffs have never established a point at which the

permissive use, admittedly given to Norman Smith and his family, became adverse to Norman
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Smith's successors in interest, the Plaintiffs. Without evidence of such an event, the permissive
use was never changed to adverse use, and consequently, the Plaintiffs' claims fail. Therefore,
the Plaintiffs' use of Green v. Stansfield provides no support for its appeal.
The Plaintiffs' reliance on State v. Hawkins by their own quote is not applicable to this
case because they quote the court saying a license allows occupation of property only so far as is
necessary to do the license and act no further. It deals specifically with a special license to use
the land and not to a prescriptive easement. It also fails to point out that the ruling in Hawkins
says that if a person uses it different than the license was given that they become a trespasser.
Plaintiffs have made no claim that they use it different than the permissive use given by Mr. Peay.
The fact that a permissive use does not preclude a later finding of adverse use ignores the
requirement that some event or circumstance must be demonstrated to illustrate when the
permissive use became adverse. The Plaintiffs also ignore the fact that at the time that the
permissive use was given, Mrs. Hall was a part of the Norman and Myrle Smith family, and
therefore, the permissive use was not passed by reason of the passage of title, but by reason of
the permission given to the Smith family. Citations set forth therein as to a license are not
applicable to the issues before the Court in this case. Halls never cite any circumstance or
argument or disagreement that would have created an adverse use by them converting it from a
permissive use to an adverse use. Their own evidence refutes such adverse use. Even if such
event had occurred, Plaintiffs would still fail because of the admitted interruption in use. If
measured from Halls' acquisition of title in 1973 — it was 14 years until the blocking of access
in 1987 and only 15 years from the 1987 blocking until the suit was filed precluding the 20 year
period of uninterrupted adverse use.
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While the specifics of the 1987 closure of the road were given to the Court, the Plaintiffs
themselves admitted that every 3 to 4 years the access way had been closed off for maintenance.
Further as pointed out to the trial court, Brigham Young University closes all of their roads one
day a year and used the time to resurface or slurry coat the roads, just as in this case.
In their Appellants' Brief, the Plaintiffs cite to State v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966 (Utah App.
1998), two Idaho cases, State v. Camp, 8 P.3d 657, 662 (Idaho App. 2000) and Rowan v. Riley,
72 P.3rd 889, 896 (Idaho 2003), and a Colorado case, Booker v. Cherokee Water District, 651
P.2nd 452, 453 (Colo App. 1982). None of the cases are applicable. First, all the principles and
holdings in Hawkins, Camp, Rowan and Booker involve licenses, not easements. "An easement
is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the
general use of the property by the owner." Rowan at 896. In contrast, a "license is a permissive
use of land by which the owner allows another to come onto his land for a specific purpose." Id.
There are further differences as well, as shown below, which make the Plaintiffs' discussion of
these cases irrelevant to the issues in this appeal.
State v. Hawkins is a criminal burglary case arising out of an eviction. It has no facts
applicable to this case. In Hawkins, a tenant abandoned a lease, was contacted by the landlord
and instructed to retrieve the personal property left at the leased premises. The tenant returned
several months later and sometime between 4:00 and 6:30 AM, kicked in the door of the leased
premises, and took various personal property not belonging to the tenant. After being charged
with burglary, the tenant claimed that he had been given express authority to return and retrieve
his property, which authority, the tenant claimed, had never been revoked. The court simply
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explained that the tenant did not have the authority to kick in the door at that time in the morning
because:
A license allows occupation of a property only so far as it is
necessary to do the licensed act, and no further. A license must be
exercised only in the manner and for the special purpose for which
consent was given; if exercised in any other manner, or if the
permission given is exceeded, the licensee becomes a trespasser. A
license cannot justify acts unless they are within its terms, and those
terms will not be strained beyond a fair and reasonable
interpretation.
Hawkins at 971. Nothing in this holding applies to the case at bar. First,

Hawkins did not

involve an easement, but rather, a license. The tenant had no right to use the land, only a
purported right to enter the land for a specific purpose. Second, the only question inHawkins is
whether the tenant went beyond the license granted. No such question is at issue in the case at
bar. The question in the case at bar is not whether a party went beyond an express license
granted, but rather, whether the permission to use a road must be granted expressly and formally,
and to each and every member of a family. Nothing in Hawkins addresses this issue.
The Plaintiffs cite to similarly inapplicable holdings in Camp, Rowan and Booker. The
Plaintiffs cite Booker for the proposition that "a license is a personal privilege to do some act
upon the land of another." (Appellants' Brief, page 8.) This holding has no effect on the case
at bar. Again, this is a case about a license, not an easement. Further, even if the discussion of
a license was applicable, the Booker court explained that "a bare license is revocable," and it is
clear from the evidence in this case that the permission to use the access was revoked by the
Defendants. Booker at 453. Nothing in Booker stands for the proposition that permission to use
an access as an easement must be granted formally to each and every member of a family.
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The Plaintiffs cite Camp and Rowan for the proposition that an express license between
two specific parties expires upon the death of one of the parties. This principle, however,
provides no support for the Plaintiffs' appeal. First, this is a principle specific to licenses, not
easements. Rowan specifically notes that this is one of the differences between licenses and
easements. Rowan at 896. Second, like theHawkins case, Camp and Rowan involve parties who
went beyond the license granted. The question in the case at bar is not whether a party went
beyond an express license granted, but rather, whether permission to use an access as a permissive
easement must be granted expressly and formally, and to each and every member of a family.
Nothing in Camp or Rowan addresses this issue.
Because the Plaintiffs provide no support for the argument that permission to use an access
as an easement must be formally and expressly given, and because they provide no support for
the argument that the permission to use an access or an easement must be given "by agreement,"
the first Issue on appeal should be rejected. The cases cited by the Plaintiffs do not support the
Plaintiffs' arguments, and contain facts which are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case
at bar.
B.

The Plaintiffs Were Permitted to Use the Defendants' Property as an Access
as a Neighborly Accommodation.

The Plaintiffs' secondary argument on the first Issue on appeal is that the Halls should not
be considered part of Norman Smith's family. That argument fails, first of all, because it is
simply untrue. The Halls are the daughter and son-in-law of Mr. And Mrs. Norman Smith.
There is no reasonable basis to limit "family" to only some members of the family. Second, even
if the Halls consider themselves to no longer be a part of the Norman Smith family, the fact
remains that the Defendants, the Peays, considered them to be a part of the Norman Smith family,
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and granted them permission to use the road. Third, the "family" argument fails because it is not
relevant. Even if the Plaintiffs were not part of the Norman Smith "family", and even if the
Defendants were mistaken in that regard, the fact remains that the Defendants gave the Plaintiffs'
predecessors in title permission to use the access. The reasons for the giving of the permission
are not important, rather, the important fact is that permission was given.
Again, permission need not be given by agreement and it need not be formalized.
Permission to use a road, as stated above, can arise from an unspoken "neighborly
accommodation" accompanied by "any recognition," express or implied, of the right of the land
owner to stop such use. See, Savage at 35. The Defendants gave permission to the Plaintiffs,
regardless of their relationship to Norman Smith, and such permission precludes a prescriptive
easement from arising.
Lastly, even if the trial court made an error regarding the permission granted by the
Defendants to the Plaintiffs, any such an error would be harmless because the fact remains that
no prescriptive easement can arise when use has been interrupted before the twenty (20) year
prescriptive period runs. The undisputed facts show that the Plaintiffs' use of the road was
repeatedly and completely interrupted, thereby preventing a prescriptive easement from arising,
regardless of the issue of permissive use.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS' PERMISSIVE USE WAS INTERRUPTED REGULARLY.
The Plaintiffs' argument relating to the second Issue on appeal, like the main argument on

the first Issue, is not new, and was similarly rejected by the Court. The Plaintiffs acknowledge
that the Defendants periodically and for several days at a time, denied the Plaintiffs the use of the
access. (Appellants' Brief, pages 10-11, Record at 356.) However, the Plaintiffs argue that these
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complete closures do not qualify as interruptions sufficient to effectively interrupt the twenty (20)
year prescriptive use period. The Plaintiffs again provide no support for this argument.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly explained "under the well established rule, the use,
in order that it may ripen into a prescriptive title, must, in any case, not only be adverse and
continuous, and under claim of right for a period 20 years, but it must be

uninterrupted

throughout that period." Morris v. Blunt. 161 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916)(emphasis added).
As a consequence of, and in reliance of this rule of law, Brigham Young University makes it a
regular policy to barricade and deny access to its roads each Labor Day. This denial of access
for one day effectively interrupts any claim of continuous use by any party, and thereby insures
that no one will obtain a prescriptive easement over Brigham Young University's property and
uses the time to resurface or slurry coat the roads, just as in this case and that is what constitutes
their prevention of prescriptive easements. The Defendants have done the exact same thing here,
and it is equally effective. The Defendants have regularly placed barricades and ropes, asphalted
and slurry coated the property, and prevented the Plaintiffs and other neighbors to the north from
any access over their property
The Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants only closed the access for the purpose of
maintenance, and therefore, the interruptions are not effective. First, this argument fails because
it is not true. The Affidavit of Robert Peay clearly states that the access was closed for two
reasons: maintenance and to prevent any prescriptive easement from arising. (Record at 203-204;
200.) These facts were never disputed with any evidence. Second, this argument fails because
whether the road was closed for maintenance is irrelevant. The fact remains that the access was
closed off and all use was prevented because of these closures. Plaintiffs could not and did not
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use the access during these closures The fact that the Defendants exercised then right to close
the road is the exact sort of "recognition

of the right of the landowner to stop such use"

described by the court in Savage v Nielson

The exercise of this right effectively prevents a

prescriptive easement from arising
Moreover, it was not merely the Defendants that recognized this right, but the Plaintiffs
also Plaintiffs, if they truly had a right to use the property, could have brought an action against
the Defendants to prevent the periodic closures, but never did so, and in fact, the Plaintiffs never
objected to any of the Defendants' closures; and therefore, under the rationale of Savage v
Nielson and Thompson v Shuh, cited m section IA of this Brief, these closures are sufficient to
interrupt the twenty (20) year prescriptive use period
Plaintiffs purport to support their argument that the court made an error by citing to Am
Jur

The specific Am Jur case cited by the Plaintiffs is a West Virginia case stating that "an

occasional detour along a portion of a way will not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
as to the original way, Walls v Denoon "sic", 550 S E 2nd 653, 657 (W

VA

2001) "

25 Am Jur 2D Easements and Licenses § 69 (1996) The Walls v Denoone, however, is not
applicable to the facts m the case at bar
Walls v Denoone involves the abandonment of an easement The party arguing that an
easement had been abandoned argued that because the easement holder (Mr Weaver) had driven
on the easement until he reached a fence, and then proceeded through the fence on foot, that the
easement had been abandoned In rejecting this argument the court noted that "the mere fact that
the holder of an easement has made a detour around some obstruction in a right ol way does not
extinguish or effect the existence of the right of way " Walls at 657

21

This holding, however,

does not apply to the case at bar. In the Denoone case, the easement holder was not prevented
from using the easement, despite the gate. The court explained that "clearly, the right of way was
used for pedestrian property and vehicular traffic after the gate was erected. The only dispute is
whether there was vehicular passage over the final few feet of the easement into what became the
Denoon property, and the evidence on that point is conflicting." Denoone at 658.
In the case at bar, however, no such facts or questions exist. First, it is undisputed that
the Plaintiffs were prevented from using the Defendants' property for access for days at a time,
for either vehicular, pedestrian or other type of traffic. Second, it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs
were prevented from using the entire access over the Defendants' land, and not merely a portion.
Third, under long-standing Utah law, in order for a prescriptive easement to arise, use must "not
only be adverse and continuous, and under claim of right for a period of 20 years, but it must be
uninterrupted throughout that period." Morris v. Blunt. 161 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1916); see
also Jensen v. Gerrard, 39 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1935). In Morris v. Blunt, the Supreme Court held
that because the defendant had plowed the road and from time to time placed rocks in the road and
otherwise interrupted the plaintiffs use throughout the 20 year period, the court concluded that
"the use was not uninterrupted, and that no right by prescription could arise under these
circumstances." Icf In the case at bar, the Defendants regularly placed barricades and ropes,
asphalted and slurry coated his property, and prevented the Plaintiffs and other neighbors to the
north from accessing their property over the Defendants' property. (Record Transcript page 6
lines 4-9; Record at 179 paragraph 8; 188; 190; 199-201; 203-204; 229 paragraphs 8-11; 286
paragraphs 8-11.) The Supreme Court in Griffiths v. Archibald reemphasized the necessity of
continuous and uninterrupted use. The court stated that "if the use is against the owner's will and
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he interrupts or requires the user to constantly fight or scramble therefore, then the use is not
peaceful and cannot create a prescriptive easement." Griffiths v. Archibald, 272 P.2d 586, 588
(Utah 1954); see also Thompson v. Griffiths, 344 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1959). It is clear under
Utah law that no prescriptive easement can arise out of the facts in our case.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN HOLDING THAT A NEW
TRIAL WAS NOT WARRANTED.
The third Issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in determining that the purported

"new" evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs after summary judgment had been granted warranted
a new trial.
A.

The Plaintiffs Failed to Meet the Requirements to Warrant a New Trial.

There are numerous cases by the Utah Appellate Courts defining the burden of the party
filing a Motion for New Trial based on newly discovered evidence pursuant to Rule 59. Only a
few of which will be cited herein. In Universal Inv. Co. v. Carpets, Inc.. 16 Utah 2d Reports
336, 400 P.2d 564 (1965) the court said:
In order to warrant granting such a motion the moving party must meet these
requirements: there must be material, competent evidence which is in fact "newly
discovered"; which by due diligence could not have been discovered and produced
at trial; and it must not be merely cumulative or incidental, but it must be of
sufficient substance that there is a reasonable likelihood that with it there would
have been a different result. (Emphasis added).
In 1982, in the case of Doty v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656 P.2d 993, the Supreme Court said:
To be entitled to . . . a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the
defendant must show that: (a) there is material, competent evidence which is in fact
newly discovered; (b) by due diligence the evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at trial; and (c) the evidence must not be merely
cumulative or incidental but must be of sufficient substance that there is a
reasonable likelihood that with it there would have been a different result.
Gregerson v. Jensen, Utah, 617 P.2d 369, 372 (1980). The difficulty with the
defendant's contention is that it has failed to show that it exercised due diligence
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1o discover the alleged new evidence which it arguably had in its possession the
entire time. (Emphasis added).
The court has confirmed the elements required of the moving party in Promax Development Corp.
v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Cert, denying 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997))
wherein the court stated:
To succeed on such a motion, a party must establish: (1) the existence of newly
discovered evidence which is material and competent; (2) that by due diligence the
evidence could not have been discovered and produced before trial; and (3) that the
evidence is not merely cumulative or incidental, but is substantial enough that with
the evidence there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result. (Emphasis
added).
B.

The Plaintiffs Were in Possession of the Purported "New" Evidence from the
Commencement of Litigation.

The Plaintiffs claim that the "new" evidence has been newly discovered and therefore
meets the first requirement set forth above. This argument fails for several reasons, first, because
the purported "new" evidence is a 1992 deed which the Plaintiffs had in their possession and
clearly knew about from the outset of litigation. It is not new evidence in any sense of the word.
In fact, the Plaintiffs included this 1992 deed in their Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures. (Record at
395-413, specifically 405, copy attached as Addendum "B".) The Plaintiffs claim that this should
be considered new evidence because it was not understood until after summary judgment was
granted. As the Plaintiffs' affidavit says, she was "unaware" of its supposed legal significance.
(Record at 364.) The Plaintiffs' failure to perceive or understand the supposed legal significance
of the 1992 deed until after summary judgment does not make the evidence new, and certainly
does not warrant a new trial. The trial court's holding that the 1992 deed was not new evidence
was not error and should not be reversed.
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Next, because the Plaintiffs cannot reasonably argue that the 1992 deed is new, they imply
that they could not, with due diligence, discover the significance and meaning of the 1992 deed.
(Appellants' Brief, pages 13-14.) First, the relevant determination is not whether the Plaintiffs
could, with due diligence, discover the significance or meaning of the 1992 deed. Instead, the
relevant determination is whether the Plaintiffs could, with due diligence, discover the evidence
itself- that is, the 1992 deed. Promax Development Corp. and the other cases cited above require
that it be shown "that by due diligence the evidence could not have been discovered." (Emphasis
added). On this point, the fact that not only could the 1992 deed be discovered, but in fact, was
discovered and disclosed by the Plaintiffs destroys the Plaintiffs' claims for a new trial.
Second, even if the relevant determination was whether the significance or meaning of the
1992 deed could be discovered, the Plaintiffs' argument should still be rejected. It is clear, as the
trial court held, that the supposed legal significance of the evidence could, with due diligence,
easily have been found by merely conducting a survey or other means. The Plaintiffs never
provide any reason why they could not conduct a survey, as the trial court suggested. Instead,
the Plaintiffs simply blame the Defendants for supposedly misleading them. Such excuses have
no bearing on whether the Plaintiffs used due diligence, and therefore, such excuses are
insufficient to allow a new trial in this matter. In fact, the Plaintiffs did have the area surveyed
and attached a copy of the survey to their Motion for New Trial after the Court's grant of
Summary Judgment to Defendants. (Record at 367-368.)
Third, the Plaintiffs' excuses for not exercising due diligence are not legitimate. The
Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants misled them with a June 29, 2004 survey. (Appellants' Brief
page 14.) However, the June 29, 2004 survey could not possibly have misled the Plaintiffs into
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not performing due diligence prior to the summary judgment for the simple fact that the June 29,
2004 survey came into existence more than a month after the Court's memorandum decision
granting Summary Judgment to Defendants on May 24, 2004. (Record at 352.) Further, the
Plaintiffs claimed to support their allegation that the Defendants misled them by submitting their
own survey to the trial court. Regardless of which survey is accurate, the fact that the Plaintiffs
submitted this survey is proof that the Plaintiffs were capable of performing the due diligence
required to prepare for summary judgment. It should be remembered that the Plaintiffs had the
opportunity to obtain such a survey prior to summary judgment, chose not to do so, and at the
summary judgment hearing confirmed this decision by insisting to the Court that all the relevant
facts were before the Court and that a decision on summary judgment could be made. (Record,
Transcript, page 3, lines 20-22, 24-25, page 4, lines l-6)(Record at 350.)
On newly discovered evidence, the Plaintiffs ignore their own statement of the decisions
on what defines newly discovered evidence. While they acknowledge they had the deed, they
assert that the Halls did not have the actual surveyed property until after the grant of summary
judgment. That assertion ignores that under due diligence they could have surveyed it and they
certainly had the deed in their possession because they attached it to their Rule 26(a) Disclosures.
Plaintiffs argue that the Halls did not know the location of the deeded property in relation to the
access road. That is exactly what they are required to have discovered, because it was all
available and the trial judge was correct in ruling that this was not newly discovered evidence.
It is inconceivable that Plaintiffs would assert they did not know until after the summary judgment
that the Peays did not own the access roadway to which they claim a prescriptive easement. If
that is the case, then there would be no reason for Plaintiffs to have attached the 1992 Gillespie
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deed to their Rule 26(a) Disclosures. In the motion for new trial, Plaintiffs claim that they merely
did not know the significance of the deed. That is a reflection on their own lack of due diligence
and cannot constitute newly discovered evidence. Aside from that, the access in which Plaintiffs
claim a prescriptive easement was in large part encompassed within the original 1969 deed by
Olive Hauter to the Peays, and thus, the access was on the Peays' property and Peays had owned
it since 1969. Peays had full right to give or deny permission to go on that access way since
1969.
The claim of Halls that they had no reason to suspect that the access was not completely
acquired by the Peays until 1992, is a verification of the Plaintiffs' lack of due diligence and
failure to discover evidence which was readily available at all times by the simple expedient of
having it surveyed, as they did after the summary judgment was granted.
CONCLUSION
The material facts of this case remain undisputed. The Plaintiffs failed to establish a
prescriptive easement over the Defendants' land because the Plaintiffs' use of the Defendants'
property was permissive. (Record at 200 paragraph 3; 230 paragraph 4; 288 paragraph 4.) The
Plaintiffs' attempt to create new law requiring that permission be given formally and "by
agreement" has no basis in Utah law or any other state's law, and such a requirement would
destroy the very nature of neighborly accommodation.
The trial court's decision is likewise not error for a second reason — the Plaintiffs' use
of the Defendants' access, even if not permissive, was not continuous and uninterrupted for the
required 20 years. The fact remains undisputed that the Defendants interrupted the Plaintiffs' use
of the access on numerous occasions. This fact is actually admitted by the Plaintiffs. (Record
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Transcript page 6 lines 4-9; Record at 179 paragraph 8; 188; 190; 199-201; 203-204; 229
paragraphs 8-11; 286 paragraphs 8-11.) The Plaintiffs' argue that these several-day-long
interruptions were insufficient to effectively interrupt the Plaintiffs' use. The Plaintiffs, however,
fail to support this argument with any relevant law.
Lastly, the Plaintiffs argue that a new trial was warranted on the basis that new evidence
had been found. The fact is, however, that no new evidence was found, but rather, its supposed
importance was newly understood. (Record at 364.) The undisputed facts show that the Plaintiffs
were in possession of the "new" evidence from the commencement of litigation and actually
produced the evidence in their Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures. (Record at 395-413, specifically
405.) Further, even if such newly understood evidence can be considered "new", the fact remains
that the evidence could have been understood prior to the summary judgment. The Plaintiffs
failed to establish the elements necessary to warrant a new trial, and therefore, the trial court's
decision was not in error.
Defendants ask this Court to award them their costs and attorney's fees for this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this s^^>

~ciay of May, 2005.
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.

28

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that the original of Appellee's Brief was hand delivered to 1he Utah Court
of Appeals, 450 South State, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and copies mailed to the below named
parties by placing same in the United States mails postage prepaid, this *4
2005, addressed as follows:
Phillip E. Lowry, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603

M. Dayle Jeffs

29
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
Provo, Utah
April 6, 1973
Present:

Ray E. Gammon, Chairman
J . Victor Leifson, Board Member
Robert K. Dusenberry, Board Member
Q. M. Burdick, Board Member
Jay H. Bishop, County Building Official
Margaret G. Agnew, Secretary

The following citizens were also present: Lowell W. Carney, Elda Carney,
Dorothy T. Steele, Harry M. Steele, Naomi Keetch, Fred A. Keetch,
Fred S. Keetch, Larry R. Williams, Sherrie Williams, June Dean, Donna
Hail, Dean Hail, Norman J. Smith, Jessie N. Smith, Jim A. Rigtrup,
Al G. Rigtrup, Carolyn M. Rigtrup, Olive Haueter, Jay O. Haueter,
Julia D. Raven, Errol J. Raven, Rodney Raven, Colleen Raven, J. T. Walker,
James M. Peterson, LaRita Peterson, Sears and Mark Hintze.
APPEAL NO,
293

Mr. Al G, Rigtrup submitted his application on March 9,
1973, requesting a zone usage variance to his property
located at 6055 South 3200 West, Utah County, and which
is situated within the Commercial-1 and Agriculture-1 Zone District.
He would like to build a new modern hatchery and caretaker's home in
the Commercial Zone. He would also like the home to be as close to the
hatchery as p o s s i b l e . The hatchery is a 24 hour job and a home needs to
be as close as possible to hear the alarms. The hatchery can be built
in the Commercial Zone, but, according to the Ordinance, the home cannot.
There is good farm land behind the Commercial Zone which is situated within
the A-l Zone, but Mr. Rigtrup does not want to waste part of the land to
build a home,
There were no objections to the appeal.
Decision: Mr. Leifson moved that the Board grant Appeal #293 to
Al G. Rigtrup for a zone usage variance subject to the hatchery and home
being no closer than 50 ft. from the road. The motion was seconded by
Mr, Burdick and carried unanimously by the Board.
APPEAL NO.
294 & 295

Norman JI< Smith and Dean B. Hall submitted their applications
on March 2 1 , 1973, requesting permission to construct two
homes on their property located at 5280 and 52 60 North
Canyon Road. The properties are in the RA-1 Zone District. According to
the County Zoning Ordinance, a 100 ft. frontage on a state or county or
federal road must be present before a personal resident building permit
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^ 1 1 be issued. Provo City has a warranty deed for a strip of land which
is also an a c c e s s road used by many different individuals to a water weir
house. This strip divides approximately an 800 ft. frontage on North Canyon
Road which is a State Road, and 18 acres proposed for building. Question
arises whether the frontage can be applied to the other divided property.
On the south boundary of the proposed building site is a dirt road which
connects directly to the state highway and has been used as a right-of-way
for over twenty y e a r s .
Mr. Jesse Smith presented the Board with a letter written by Provo
City giving permission for securing an easement. The deeded piece of
property to Provo City is not recorded as an easement.
Jesse Smith will deed two parcels of land to his son and s o n - i n - l a w
for the homes.
There were no objections to the a p p e a l s .
Decision: Mr. Dusenberry moved that AppeSl #2 94"and ^295 to
Norman J. Smith and Dean B. Hall be granted for a frontage variance subject
to approval of receiving the Provo City easement and obtaining 100 ffe,
frontage on the road for each residence.
APPEAL NO.
296

Larry R. Williams and June T. Dean submitted an application
on March 2 1 , 1973, requesting a frontage variance to
the property located at 7290 North 5300 W e s t , in the RA-1
Zone District. There is 2 50 ft. fronting on an off-ramp to 1-15 but this
is not an a c c e s s i b l e frontage. Mr. Williams feels that there is a deeded
right-of-way into the property and he brought papers of the warranty deeds
back from 1897. The right-of-way is only 2 rods wide (33ft.) This is the
only a c c e s s to the property.
Mr. and Mrs. Steele feel that the right-of-way is only a t r a i l .
own the land which the disputable right-of-way c r o s s e s .

They

The Board decided that the case was prematurely brought before the
Board. Mr. Dusenberry moved that action on this appeal be tabled until
the right-of-way dispute is resolved. Mr. Burdick seconded the motion
and it was unanimously passed by the Board.
APPEAL NO.
297

Janell Money submitted an application on March 2 1 , 1973,
requesting permission for a home occupation at 5725 South
1150 W e s t , in the RA-1 Zone District. She would like
to have a beauty shop in her home and she will be the only operator.

Addendum B

PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P O Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone. (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

i \26765-l\initial disclosures

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID GASHLER, DEAN HALL, and
DONNA HALL,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

PLAINTIFFS' INITIAL DISCLOSURES
Case No. 020405580
Judge Claudia Laycock
Division #5

ROBERT E. PEAY and JANICE P. PEAY,
Defendants
Plaintiffs hereby make initial disclosures as required by Rule 26, U. R. Civ P.
1

The following witnesses are those presently known to plaintiffs who are believed

to have discoverable information regarding the events surrounding the events in this lawsuit and
the damages sustained by the plaintiffs*
A

Dean Hall, 5480 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604 Subject: Will

testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002.
B.

Donna" Hall, 5480 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 8460?! Subject: Will

testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002.
C

Robert E. Peay, 5400 North Canyon Road, Provo, Ut§

D.

Janice P. Peay, 5400 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604. Subject:

E.

David Gashler, 692 West 1600 North, Mapleton, Utah 84664. Subject:

Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002.
F.

Steve White 5490 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604. Subject: Will

testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002.
G.

Sandy White, 5490 North CanyonRoad, Provo, Utah 84604. Subject: Will

testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002.
H.

Wesley Clay Smith, 5440 North 274 East, Orem, Utah 84057. 801-623-

2126. Subject: Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002.
I.

Barbara Smith, 866 North 275 East, Orem, Utah 84057. 801-623-2761.

Subject: Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002.
J.

Scott G. Smith, 294 East 4840 South, Provo, Utah. 84604. Subject: Will

testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002.
K.

Gary and Mini Smith, 5082 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84064. 801-

224-2985 Subject: Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002.
L.

Jack and Rebecca Rhodes, 5500 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84064.

801-224-84$fi. Subject: Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August
2002.
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M.

Verl and Aria Smith, 5253 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84064. 801-

225-0431. Subject: Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August, 2002.
N.

Stanley and Jacque Smith, 5068 North Canyon Road, Provo Utah 84064.

801-225-1629. Subject: Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August,
2002.
O.
801-224-1587.

Roger and Janie Gillespie, 5013 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604.
Subject: Will testify that there has never been a gate in place before August,

2002.
P.

Russell O. Brown, P.E., RB&G Engineering, Inc., 1435 West 820 North,

Provo, Utah 84601. 801-374-5771. Subject: See report and letter.
2.

The following documents are potential exhibits at the time of trial:
A.

Report from RB&G Engineering, Inc. dated March 25, 2003.

B.

Letter from RB&G Engineering, Inc. dated March 25, 2003.

C.

Audio Tape of conversation between Mr. Hall and Mr. Peay

D.

Letter from Robert Peay to Scott Smith dated October 10, 2002.

E.

Letter from Robert Peay to Dean and Donna Hall dated January 27, 2003.

F.

Aerial Photographs of the area.

G.

Letter from Scott G. Smith to Robert Peay dated February 7, 2003.

H.

Warranty Deeds dated July 10, 1992, June 12, 1945, April 25, 1973 and

July 26, 1950.
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I.

Quit Claim Deeds dated July 8, 1929 and what is believed to be dated

November 10, 2002.
J.
3.

Photographs of the property.

The damages computed at this time are outlined in the complaint filed by the

Plaintiffs and also include the documents outlined above and attached hereto. Plaintiff is still
compiling information tofinalizethe damages associated with this litigation.
4:

Insurance: N/A.

DATED t h i s ^ L day of July, 2003.

\

x

Phillip Lowry, (for
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following,
postage prepaid, this _J

day oH^y^2003V

M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq.
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 North 100 East
Provo, UT 84606
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February 7, 2003

Dear Bob,
When I received your letter last fall 1 passed it off as part of your disagreement with Dean and
Donna, which 1 have chosen to stay entirely out of. 1 was confident, given time, that both parties
would settle reasonably. It is unfortunate that it has gotten personal. The only part of that letter I
agreed with was that our families have been good friends through the years. My dad believed, as
do I, that neighbors talk things out instead of fighting them out. Owing to the good relationship
you and 1 have always had, 1 thought that you would come to talk to me man-to-man if this was
serious.
From the contents of the letter 1 received last week, I can see that you are serious and determined.
But you are mistaken about some facts. In my copy of the ''Water Line Easement Grant", dated
June 1977, that you attempted to get my father and mother to sign, you sought to obtain exactly
what you still need now. I think that you know the reason that Dad refused to sign;it?" The
language reveals that you knew that we had a right to use the waterline, not only because you
made an agreement with Dad when it was installed, but because the watferline is located on Smith
property, which it now has been for thirty years. You wanted, throJgn^hat agreement, to secure
the same rights that we had, for your successors and assigns. You also needed a maintenance
easement. You knew that the original verbal agreement was between you and my dad, and didn't
extend to your successors and assigns. If you needed it then, you need it trow.
That waterline was relocated and re-engjneered, from Roger's gm§n w4No Trespassing" sign to
the east border of what is now the deer fence, in 1983 when the Provo City water tank was
constructed. The city, with the intent to secure stability of the line over time, built the new line,
which they refer to as the Srnith-Peay water line, out of ductile cast iroir'pipe. This was a
substantial improvement over plastic pvc pipe. The city replaced and rerouted over half the
original line. There has been no need for maintenance on the pipe kseslf since it was
reconstructed.
In the ten years, from 1973-1983, that the line was in place, you raised no objection to the
original agreement between you and Dad, The only attempt to reduce anything to writing was
your request for a waterline agreement in June of 1977. if you'd had any objection when the-eity
relocated the line, it was not noted in the county Board of Adjustment meeting notes where the
city agreed to relocate and reconstruct the line. You didn't object then because you were in
agreement.
In the letter from your attorney he claims that "liability has been substantially increased because
of [my] failure to properly maintain a large part" of the distribution system. The system on my
property has not only been maintained, but substantially improved in the past few years. The
only time I have had any mishap on my system is when you allowed Jack to split the water turn
with you. The only time I can recall water flooding anywhere in any major amount is when
someone turns the valve off coming down to us and fails to open the main valve allowing it to
ilow south down the Smith Ditch tributary-like when your hired hand did it a couple of years
back.

0)1439

In view of present and future possibilities of property changing ownership, some kind of
agreement must be reached. The entire pipeline in question is on Donna's, then Wesley's
property. Since you still don't have an easement or maintenance agreement, the prudent thing to
do would be to secure them from the property owners instead of taking inflammatory measures
that will make that impossible.
This letter is my attempt to resolve this issue without havmg to litigate. If I am short on the facts,
I would like to be brought up to speed. If you have any desire to work this out without gotng to
court, please contact me.
Yott, of all people, understand straight forward language. Understand that this is nothing
personal. One thing you and 1 have been able to do is speak honestly with each other. Quite
frankly, 1 have enjoyed that relationship. 1 hope that this situation is a rock in the road that we
can work around. Recently you have chosen to reduce our relationship to writing, so 1 have
responded in like manner. If you have any desire to talk m person, I suggest we take a walk up
on the hill rather than meet at either of our homes.

Sincerely,

Scott G. Smith

033408

=PE4Y'S SUN CANYON &4NCH—
5400 North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah 84604 801-225-1581

Jan.27-03
Att.Dean and Donna Hall
I l e f t a message on your phone concerning your son Timmy shooting quail
and other wild l i f e birds on your property out of season. Just because
these w i l d l i f e birds are on your property does not give him or anyone else
the right to shoot them out of season. I have recived this knowlodc$- from a
very close source to your family, and as 1 put out large feeders in my back
yard to help the quail Phesants and turkeys thru the winter I guess that is
why we'have f a i l e d to see any birds useing them. Please see that this is
stopped immediately as i f I hear any more shooting or recive any more
information from my source I w i l l call the Fish and Game Dept. and have them
investigate.

sn0437

PEAY'S Construction & Rentals
585 East 300 South
PROVO, UTAH 84606
Phone 801 3 74-9200

BOBPEAY

CRAIG PEAY
Vice President

President

Oct. 10, 02
Scott Smith
294 East 4840 North
Provo, Utah 84604

Dear Scott:

This l e t t e r is concerning'my irrigation p?pe, which I have given
you permission to use to transport irrigation water to your property
which is North of my property.
Just so that there is ao Mi sunder standing, I w&ht you to know that there
is No Permanent Easement of any kind granted to you with my permission,
to use the pipe line. He are such good friends I just diden't want to have
any disagrement with you in the futher concerning your use of my water pipe.
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WITNESS THE HAND _
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> of said Grantor.

July.,

A.D.

1931

ned in the-presence of
V J a m e M.

G i x l e s p i e ^

STATE OF LPTAH,
County of

Utab

Qn the

day of

JU1

Y

. A. D. 19 ? 2 . ,

before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Utah

personally appeared

Roger S. G i l l e s p i e

,

.

and Janie H. G i l l e s p l
x

-••••«...

the signer^_of the above insirument, who duly acknowledged to me that_tJiey_ execvteji;the^aTOe.

My commission expires^
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